So who won?

For weeks the ordinary citizen has been watching Hezbollah and Israel alike claiming victory for a war that could only be won by a fatal blow. If victory can be measured by achievements, an equally important parameter one should take into consideration is the ability of a party to avoid being squeezed into uncomfortable situations, during and after a conflict, that might make it hard for the party in question to defend its positions and hold on to its principles. In that regard, the results of the July 2006 war turned out to be most embarrassing for both sides:

• Israel’s inability to crush an organization of a few thousands – albeit very disciplined, well-equipped and trained – warriors pulverized what was thought to be an unshakable myth in the Arab world: the myth of the invincibility of the IDF, nurtured by Israel and the Arab regimes for decades and strongly verified on the ground after a series of wars of disastrous consequences for Arab countries. That myth had already received a heavy blow in April 2000 with the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon due, to a large extent, to the resistance. For the first time, the State of Israel unilaterally submits an Arab land without receiving anything in return: no peace treaty, no guarantees, not even a return to the 1949 armistice. Hezbollah, which masters public relations and war media, knew how to invest, spread and nurture this success to the eager Arab masses. Many believe that this event set the scene for the second Intifada in the Occupied Palestinian Territories which erupted in September 2000. For Israel, the current war seemed a wonderful opportunity to settle scores with Hezbollah. The growing influence of the Iranian-backed organization on the Palestinian struggle and regional events, coupled with Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s charisma posed a threat to Israel and the Israelis calmly waited for a faux-pas they could exploit to crush what they define as a “terrorist group”. That faux-pas would come on July 12, 2006 when Hezbollah militants crossed over the borders and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. It was certain, given the national, regional and international contexts which I will not go through in this post, that Israel’s response was going to be extremely harsh. Indeed it was. Israel launched an all out war with the aim of destroying Hezbollah and turning the Lebanese population, mainly the Shiite, against it by concentrating its attacks on Shiite areas. It was imperative for Israel to win this war. Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres, went as far as declaring that it was a matter of life or death for the State of Israel. In fact, failing to achieve the goals would be interpreted as a weakness and Israel cannot afford to look weak in such a hostile environment. But as the days passed by, it was more and more evident that the Jewish State would not be able to achieve its objectives. Hezbollah militants resisted surprisingly well on the ground and Shiite support was growing, ironically, due to Israeli bombardments and the high number of civilian casualties. Israel had to rely on diplomatic efforts to get out of the Lebanese quagmire. What will be the consequences of such a military setback? Will it inspire the Arab masses elsewhere particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories or even the Golan Heights?
  
  
• Just as much as the Israelis, if not more, Hezbollah is keen on presenting its military achievements as a success. Indeed, surviving a fierce attack from the mighty IDF could, at first, be interpreted as a success. But if we examine the situation more closely, we’ll find that Hezbollah is in no better position than Israel. The Iranian-backed group has made out of its arms a question of principle and honor. Needless to say that over the last few years Hezbollah has lost what little it once retained of the national consensus behind the “resistance” and its arms but that did not dissuade the Party to hold on to its arsenal and, as a result, recycle the organization into a strictly political party. In fact, feeling the growing international and national pressure to disarm, Hezbollah has taken it to a new level. In a fiery speech earlier this year its Secretary General declared “we shall cut the limbs of those who will try to disarm us and pull their souls out of their bodies”. For years, the organization kept lecturing the Lebanese about its defense strategy, the only one capable of protecting the country from Israeli aggression, having built, with the help of the Iranians and Syrians, an arsenal that would presumably deter any Israeli attack. As the events of the past month have shown, this theory has, to put it mildly, miserably failed. Not only did Hezbollah arsenal fail to deter the IDF, but the latter went on to literally destroy the very same country Hezbollah intended to protect. So if these arms were so ineffective, holding on to them will certainly prove to be a bit more complicated now. Even more so after sidelining the rest of the country with its unilateral decision to launch a war against a neighbor not exactly known for its self-restraint. The poorly planned operation - as acknowledged by the Secretary General himself – has put the Party of God in an uncomfortable situation forcing it to adopt certain decisions against its will, positions that the Party would have never taken if it wasn’t cornered for they will only tighten the grip on Hezbollah and weaken it on the long-term. That is why, it came as no surprise, in such circumstances, to see the Party adopting positions it fiercely opposed in the past, prior to the July-August war. Among these are the decision to finally send the Lebanese Army to the South, and the decision to adopt Security Council resolution 1701 leading to the strengthening of the UNIFIL and the monitoring of all entry points by the Lebanese army, assisted by the international forces, to prevent arms shipment to the Hezbollah or any other third party. The outcome of the war has created a context in the South which renders any act of resistance from the part of Hezbollah very difficult if not impossible with the presence of 15,000 Lebanese soldiers along with an equal number of foreign troops thereby leaving its arsenal obsolete to a large extent. The summer adventure has, indisputably, cost the Party of God a few cards and as such claiming victory can only be understood as a means to boost its constituency and to grab on to some segments of its supporters who might be reconsidering their position.
  

The third and final party directly involved in this war, Lebanon, has suffered considerable damage both on the humanitarian and material level and paid a heavy price for a war it did not declare: 1200 victims, mostly civilians, thousands of injured, a million displaced and economic losses amounting to billions of dollars. However, if we put all this aside, one could argue that the Lebanese State is better off after the war. For the first time in decades the State is taking the necessary procedures to extend its authority to the South by deploying the Lebanese Army and declaring that no other armed group will be tolerated. This step, along with the implementation of UN resolution 1701, will put an end to acts of resistance against Israel. This is in itself a historic event: It is the end of an era that lasted for 38 years and marked the total marginalization of the State in this region on virtually all levels. The containment of a resistance which, despite popular and official support, operates beyond State control, can only be good news for Lebanese legality. This is not to say, in any way, that this is a victory for the Lebanese State, however we can probably say that the State has scored a point or two during these events, which is not insignificant if we take into consideration the fact that the State in Lebanon hardly ever knows how to manage crisis situations. Prime Minister Fouad Sanioura seems to agree. In an interview with Al-Arabiya TV a few days ago he declared: The war allowed us to move forward in the direction of state-building and to deploy the army in the South after more than 35 years of absence. These steps now need to be confirmed and asserted on the ground. The hard part is yet to come.