11 crucial days for the Tribunal

Just as it did following the resignation of the Shiite ministers, March 14 should take the initiative once again in order to finalize the adoption of the international tribunal. It’s a race against time and the majority has only 11 days left to achieve it, before the end of the current parliamentary session on the last day of 2006. The next ordinary session won’t start before March 15 2007, and the opening of an extraordinary session might prove to be a bit complicated.

The problem, as it is clear to everybody now, is that the President of the Chamber, who calls the MPs for a meeting and sets the agenda, will most probably refuse to convene the parliament in the current situation. But this is not an insurmountable problem: According to legal expert Hassan Rifai , if the speaker refuses to convene the parliament, the vice-president not only has the right, but also the obligation to do it following a petition signed by a number of MPs:

أما عن اعادة مشروع المحكمة الدولية الى مجلس الوزراء بعد تعديل الحكومة ومن ثم احالته على رئيس الجمهورية كما تطالب المعارضة، فقال الرفاعي: "لست من هذا الرأي، وقد درست كل مسودات نظام المحكمة ووضعت دراسات حولها، ولا لزوم اطلاقاً لاعادتها حتى لو قبل بذلك مجلس الأمن. وأنا أرى ان تحال فوراً على مجلس النواب فاذا لم يجتمع يجب توقيع عريضة نيابية تطالب بانعقاده ويمكن انعقاده برئاسة نائب رئيس مجلس النواب. فهذه واجبات ولا يمكن تعطيلها بحجة دستورية أو عدم دستورية الحكومة، الامر الذي يعود بته الى المجلس الدستوري".

I understand March 14’s reluctance to go down that road as it would constitute a definitive break-up with Nabih Berri, but if this is the only way to pass the Tribunal then they have no other choice. The Tribunal is a priority. It is an essential instrument to consolidate Lebanon’s fragile independence and as such it should be left outside political settlements. March 14 should make it clear to all sides that no compromise is possible regarding the Tribunal. Let it pass and then be open to discuss virtually any other topic with the opposition.

We now have the chance to adopt the text of the tribunal and the opportunity might not present itself again in a few months, with the opening of a new parliamentary session, especially that March 14 won’t retain the 2/3rd majority in case of a cabinet reshuffle. Which means that if it’s not adopted in the next few days, the Tribunal might never see the light of day. Syria and Hezbollah, backed by Iran, have declared war against it. In an interview with the Egyptian Al-Araby magazine, Hassan Nasrallah openly announced what everybody knew anyway: that the reason they took to the streets is the international tribunal. The masks are down. March 14 knows who it is dealing with, it is now up to them to take the right decision and adopt the tribunal.

Farid Makari: You can now make history.

An impressive show of force: the ongoing process of isolating the Shiite community

The opposition did not disappoint. Rallying hundreds of thousands and possibly a million people in downtown Beirut was not an easy task. It sure was an impressive show of force. But it wasn’t surprising; Hezbollah’s popularity and its ability to mobilize Shiite masses were never questioned.

However, just like on March 8, 2005, this huge crowd suffers a serious deficit: homogeneity. Friday’s demonstration was a Shiite demonstration par excellence. Despite the official presence of the FPM, general Aoun was not able to mobilize his constituency and Christian participation was below expectations. Sunni and Druze’ contribution was even weaker.

These observations should provoke serious efforts of self-criticism from both sides: On one hand, the majority should ask itself why was the opposition able to rally so many people against it? It should acknowledge the mistakes it has committed and reconsider some of its policies. It has repeatedly failed over the past year and a half to (1) retain many of its own supporters let alone to (2) attract supporters from the other side, particularly Shiites. The opposition on the other hand should ask itself why is it unable to rally considerable masses besides Shiites? It is much easier to answer that question: Hezbollah, by far the main opposition party, has so far failed to present itself as a Lebanese product and did not yet accomplish its conversion from an armed resistance to a strictly political party. In fact, the Hezbollah leadership never showed any sign it actually wants to achieve these two essential criteria and we shouldn’t hope it ever will: Resistance (little does it matter who the enemy is) is Hezbollah’s raison d’être, and the Shiite community is its reservoir of support. It doesn’t need to appeal to other Lebanese groups. And that also explains why it has constantly sought to isolate the Shiite community both culturally and politically to keep it under its own control. Some go as far as saying Hezbollah has hijacked the Shiite community. I personally don’t think it’s an exaggeration even though it is the complete absence of the State in Shiite areas that has encouraged the Iranian-backed party to take over.
As strange as it may seem, Shiites these days remind me, in a way, of the isolationist Maronites before the civil war. The process of political isolation was taken to a new level following the assassination of PM Rafic Hariri. Shiite masses were largely absent from the civil movement and the popular uprising that took place after the assassination. Hezbollah, who did not call on his supporters to participate, alongside their Lebanese compatriots, in the funerals of Hariri, was clearly disturbed by the popular movement that brought Sunnis, Christian and Druze together after February 14, 2005 and saw it as a threat to its own existence.
Instead of calling on his supporters to join their countrymen, Nasrallah later gathered them and isolated them in a nearby square in one of Lebanon’s most massive demonstrations, intended to thank the Syrian regime for its contribution during the 30 years of occupation. Nasrallah even went further in his provocative approach and honored the Syrian head of intelligence in Lebanon (highly suspected by the Lebanese to be implicated in the Hariri assassination) on the eve of the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon by offering him an Israeli riffle – captured in combat – as a farewell gift, completely ignoring the feelings of the majority of the Lebanese at that time. Over the past year, Hezbollah has multiplied its divisive approach on sensitive issues and has consolidated its grip on the Shiite community to a point where it became hard to make a distinction between the latter and Hezbollah.

After taking over the Shiite community, Hezbollah and Nasrallah are now in a process of hijacking the whole country. The process culminated in summer 2006 when the Iranian-backed militia declared war on Israel with devastating effects on Lebanon and the Lebanese people. Today’s opposition campaign is a direct result of Hezbollah’s overall defeat last summer, despite its admirable resistance on the ground.

In that regards, many have noticed a surprising similarity in the strategies and modes of communication used by Hezbollah in war time, against the Israeli enemy, and the ones used recently against Lebanese factions, namely the March 14 alliance and the government of PM Fouad Siniora: Accusation of treason, intimidation, mobilization of its constituency mainly through Al-Manar TV propaganda, promising its supporters another victory similar to the one against Israel a few months earlier, thinly veiled threats of revolution and coups etc…and the most important feature: secrecy. As much as it is understandable in war time against an enemy, it becomes appalling and unacceptable when it is used against fellow citizens and national institutions as it has been lately when the leadership of the opposition refused to announce its program, the date and place of demonstrations until the last minute (and only following major efforts from the government and the army).

Hezbollah, as a military organization, is used to the logic of either victory of defeat and in the past years it has been very successful in its struggle against Israel. Accumulating victories means forgetting that compromise is sometimes essential, especially when dealing with fellow compatriots, and even more so in a country like Lebanon. An important part of Hezbollah’s conversion into Lebanese politics is its ability to put aside its winner-loser mentality at the national level. If only for the sake of a successful conversion, it is extremely important for Hezbollah to lose this “war”.